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MORAL PLUCK:
Legal Ethics in Popular Culture
William H. Simon*
Favorable portrayals of lawyers in popular culture tend to
adopt a distinctive ethical perspective. This perspective departs
radically from the premises of the elite moralism exemplified by
the official ethics of the American bar and the arguments of the
proponents of President Clinton’s impeachment. While elite
moralism is strongly authoritarian and categorical, popular
culture exalts a quality that might be called Moral Pluck – a
combination of resourcefulness and transgression in the service of
basic but informal values. This essay traces the theme of Moral
Pluck through three of the most prominent fictional portrayals of
lawyers in recent years – the novels of John Grisham and the TV
series L.A. Law and The Practice. It suggests that this work has
two potential contributions to legal ethics – as evidence of popular
moral understanding and as a guide to ethical conduct. With
respect to the latter contribution, the essay acknowledges various
limitations but argues that the work deserves to be taken seriously
as ethical discourse, and in particular, that it holds up well in
comparison to elite moralism.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

The Conformist Tradition in Elite Moralism
The Legal Populism of John Grisham
The You-Can-Have-It All Glamour Fantasy of L.A.
Law
Role Bursting at the Seams in The Practice
Lessons from Popular Culture
Conclusion
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In a speech to a South Carolina bar association during the
Clinton impeachment crisis, Kenneth Starr invoked Atticus Finch
as an ethical role model. Many people scoffed at what they took to
be an implied self-comparison.1 Starr’s zeal in pursuing Clinton
did not seem comparable to Finch’s courage in defending a falsely
accused black man in a racist town, and the justice of Starr’s cause
was less clear that of Finch’s.
Yet the most important difference between the ethics of
Kenneth Starr and those of the hero of To Kill a Mockingbird has
yet to be noted. At the climax of Harper Lee’s novel, the hermit
Boo Radley emerges from seclusion and kills the villainous Bob
Ewell. He does so in defense of Finch’s children whom Ewell was
trying to kill. Then, in the novel’s final pages, a fascinating
development, invariably ignored by its lawyer admirers, occurs.
Finch and Heck Tate, the sheriff, agree to lie to the town by saying
that Ewell died accidentally by falling on his knife.2
There is no question that the killing was justifiable. But the
sheriff convinces Finch that the local court system, which has just
sent the patently innocent Tom Robinson to his death, has not
proven itself so reliable that it can be trusted to vindicate Radley.
So the sheriff persuades Finch to go along with the accident story.
In other words, the novel concludes with Atticus Finch engaging in
what today could only be called obstruction of justice.
Finch initially resists the sheriff’s suggestion with
arguments that would have done credit to a House Impeachment
Manager. He says it would set a bad example for children. He
says it would encourage further lawlessness. He says it would be
dishonorable. But eventually he yields, and the novel does not
intend to leave us with any doubt that he has done the right thing.
The sheriff in this scene exhibits a quality that I call Moral
1

David Kendall, “To Distort a Mockingbird,” New York Times, June 3,
1998, sec. A, p. 25, col. 2.
2

Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird 272-76 (Warner Books paperback
ed. 1982) [1960].
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Pluck.3
It involves a combination of transgression and
resourcefulness in the vindication of justice. Moral Pluck is
pervasive in favorable portrayals of lawyers in recent decades. I’m
going to try support and elaborate this claim with some
illustrations from the three most prominent fictional portrayals of
lawyers in recent years – the novels of John Grisham and the TV
series L.A. Law and The Practice.
This ethical portrayal contrasts sharply with the premises of
more established doctrines, in particular, the official ethics of the
American bar. This ethics, as articulated in the professional
responsibility codes the states have taken from the American Bar
Association, is uncompromisingly categorical and authoritarian. It
has a penchant for “black letter” injunctions designed to minimize
hard judgment and a commitment to unreflective compliance with
the commands of institutionalized authority. The categorical,
authoritarian qualities of professional responsibility rhetoric are
shared across a broad range of elite moral rhetoric. They are
strong in the doctrines of such public moralists as William Bennett
and Sissela Bok, and were especially salient in the rhetoric of
journalists and political leaders during the impeachment crisis.4
A study of legal ethics in popular culture has two possible
payoffs for legal ethics. First, some of the positions of elite
moralism, including the Bar’s norms, are based on factual premises
about popular morality. The elites justify their precepts partly in
terms of their assumed effects on ordinary people. The evidence to
be examined here suggests that these assumptions are mistaken.
At least in some moods, popular morality is disposed to a style of
3

My title phrase was inspired by the title essay in Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck 20-39 (1981). However, the argument here is largely different from
Williams’. See note below.
4

E.g., William Bennett, The Death of Outrage (1998); Sissela Bok,
Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Professional Life (1978), and the rhetoric of
the House Impeachment Managers cited below in note 43. For criticism, see
William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism,
12 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 433 (1999).
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moral judgment considerably different from the one the elites
attribute to it. Second, the portrayal of Moral Pluck is a
substantive challenge to elite doctrine. The challenge is made, not
through an explicit argument, but through dramatic representations
of a type of moral predicament and of styles of response to it. To
be sure, these works romanticize lawyering, just as “lawyer jokes”
demonize it, but their distortions are no greater than those of
established moral doctrine. While popular culture is Utopian about
the possibilities of individual initiative, established doctrine is
Utopian about the reliability of official institutions. Despite its
limitations, popular culture scores some important points against
established doctrine.
I begin by recalling the categorical and authoritarian
themes of elite moralism and especially established professional
responsibility doctrine. I proceed to describe the challenge to
those themes in Grisham’s novels, L.A. Law, and The Practice. I
then consider the potential contributions of these works to legal
ethics.
I.

The Conformist Tradition in Elite Moralism

Elite moralism in general and professional responsibility
doctrine in particular is strongly categorical and authoritarian.
Ethics is categorical when it insists on appraising conduct in
terms of rigid rules, with few if any, exceptions and excuses. To
take the most famous and extreme example, Kant insisted that lying
is always wrong, even when necessary to save an innocent life.5 In
the impeachment crisis, the President’s prosecutors denied that
either the private nature of the conduct involved or its marginal
relevance to the Paula Jones case excused or even mitigated his
perjury. They insisted that any kind of perjury be condemned as a
threat to the “rule of law.”
Professional responsibility doctrine is categorical in its in its
5

Immanual Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic
Motives,” in Ethics 180-81 (Peter Singer ed. 1994).
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proclivity for rules insensitive to the contingencies of particular
situations. Such rules tend to require “mechanical” judgment or
literalistic application.6 They not infrequently mandate that the
decisionmaker take actions that she correctly sees as unjust or
contrary to important public values. Notoriously, for example, the
confidentiality rules mandate that the lawyer keep secrets even in
some situations where disclosure might save an innocent life and
the client’s interests are trivial.7
Ethics is authoritarian when it conflates moral authority with
the explicit commands or enactments of government institutions.
For the impeachment prosecutors, it was sufficient that the
President violated a judge’s order and the terms of a Congressional
statute. Even if they had been convinced that the judge’s order was
wrong or that the statute, as applied, would subvert fundamental
privacy values, they would not have deemed these considerations
relevant. (And the President’s lawyers seemed to concede this
authoritarian view by focusing their arguments, not on appeals to
the privacy values that were threatened by an inquisition into
consensual sex, but on claims that the President had stayed within
the literal terms of the order or the statute.)
The authoritarian tendency appears in professional
responsibility doctrine in the tendency to define law and legal
authority in terms of the state. The Model Rules distinguish legal
authority from “moral, economic, social, and political factors” that,
though sometimes important, must take a back seat.8 Lawyers are
obliged to press for their clients’ interests subject only to the
constraints of formally enacted commands. At the same time,
6

An avowed purpose of the drafters of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct was to create “black letter” rules that would obviate
difficult judgments. Geoffrey Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and
Professional Aspirations, 30 Cleveland State Law Review 571, 574 (1982).
7

See Symposium: Executing the Wrong Person: The Professional’s
Ethical Dilemma, 29 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1543 (1996).
8

Model Code EC 7-8.
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lawyers are obliged to respect any norm that qualifies as law under
the test of formal enactment, even where respect contributes to
injustice. There is no tolerance, for example, for civil disobedience
-- principled noncompliance with unjust positive law. The bar’s
norms condemn “even minor violations of law by a lawyer”.9 They
insist that the only appropriate response to unjust law is to petition
institutions with formal legislative authority to enact revisions.10
All these themes contribute to a pervasive hostility to
independent judgment in professional responsibility rhetoric. This
hostility is transparent in the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, which in most states is the only testing of legal ethics
in connection with admission to the bar. The examination is
preoccupied with black letter disciplinary rules. Since it is
multiple-choice and machine-graded, it focuses on situations that
lend themselves to glib black-and-white responses. Bar review
instructors commonly advise applicants, “What they are testing is
your ability to memorize.”11
In informal legal ethics discussions, a variety of rhetorical
tropes are routinely deployed to sanction complex or independent
judgment. When lawyers appeal to informal norms of justice to
explain either violations of enacted law or refusals to push client
interests to the limits of enacted law, they are charged with selfrighteousness and self-aggrandizement: “playing God”, “arrogating
power to herself”, “imposing her own values,” “undermining the
established process”. In the academic literature, you find frequent
disapproval of discretionary norms linked to concerns about
“accountability.”12 Although it is not always clear to whom
9

Model Code EC 1-5.

10

Model Code EC 8-2.

11

Jamie Heller, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, December 16,
1994, p A38 (describing advice of lecturers in New York bar review course).
12

E.g., Stephen McG. Bundy and Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About
Legal Sanctions, 92 Michigan Law Review 261, 265-66, 313-16 (1993); David
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 103 Harvard Law Review 468,511-13
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accountability is sought, it usually appears that control by the state
is what the authors have in mind.
The moral premises of popular fictional portrayals of
lawyering are quite different from this conformist tradition.
Popular fiction is anti-categorical and anti-authoritarian.
Categorical norms require us to disregard all but a narrow range of
the particularities of the situation. But fiction is committed to
particularity.13 These works tend to summon up situations in which
general norms are at war with more powerful particularistic
intuitions. The authoritarianism of elite moralism implies a
consistently benign and reliable state. But popular culture reminds
us that the state is often incompetent or corrupt and urges us to
focus on some of the frightening and unjust consequences of its
failings.
II.

The Legal Populism of John Grisham

John Grisham’s novels exude a populist contempt for
government and big business. They give us a creepily titillating
view of the world as dominated by vast criminal conspiracies. The
conspiracies are identified with the mob, political terrorist
organizations, or large multinational corporations.
These
conspiracies are operations of staggering power, integration, and
efficiency. Agents of the government often play willing parts in
them, but more often, they are simply too selfish, arrogant, or stupid
to check them.
Grisham is also populist in seeing ordinary people (that is,
people who are not mobsters, millionaires, or government
bureaucrats) as more than occasionally good and capable of
effective resistance to evil. In the most familiar populist story line - as exemplified in many Frank Capra films -- resistance occurs
through spontaneously organized collective action. But Grisham’s
(1990).
13

See Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and
Public Life 7, 32 (1998).
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plots are closer to another familiar trope -- the lone, isolated hero
(for example, High Noon, Dirty Harry).
Most of Grisham’s novels are bildungsromans that chronicle
the moral growth of a new lawyer. The hero learns two lessons
through participation in a series of adventures. First, you cannot
plausibly understand legal or professional responsibility norms as
the categorical injunctions they purport on their surface to be. To
apply them in a manner that would make the worthy of respect
requires a flexible, dialectical judgment. Second, to the extent the
social order functions, it is not because of a system of promulgated
rules more or less routinely enforced by a self-propelling
governmental system of checks and balances, but in substantial part,
through creative, transgressive moral entrepreneurialism on the part
of individuals in crisis.
These crises arise when the hero becomes unwittingly
involved with some overwhelming menace. The menace usually
arises from an organized conspiracy. In a couple of stories there is
also an independent, subsidiary menace from a single individual -- a
violent spouse or boyfriend who terrorizes a client or friend. The
scale of this latter menace is much smaller, but psychologically, it is
portrayed as similar to the larger one -- overwhelming and
inescapable.
It is premise of thrillers of this genre that the hero would be
foolish to respond to the menace in the morally conventional
manner. The morally conventional manner is to remain passive and
law-abiding and to rely on the government for protection from the
lawless violence of the menace. For the most part, the government
is neither willing nor able to provide this protection. Its agents have
been bought off, or are pursuing selfish political agendas without
regard to the interests of the people they’re supposed to be
protecting, or are reckless and stupid. Even where officials are
more able and committed (and a few are), they are at a tremendous
disadvantage vis-a-vis the menace. They have to play by the rules,
and the mob and its analogues do not. The mob can shoot people in
the back, torture, and bribe, and the government generally can’t.
And of course, the government, unlike the mob, can

8
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generally act only on the basis of proof. Grisham’s novels are not
detective stories organized around a quest by the hero to identify the
villain. The hero and the reader know fairly early who the villain is.
So do the police. The crisis arises from the fact that the government
can’t act effectively in the absence of proof, and a central impetus
of the story is the hero’s effort to get sufficient proof to enable or
force the government to act.
In such situations, the hero has to extricate himself through
cleverness and initiative. His efforts invariably require violations of
various enacted norms.
Sometimes the violations affront
professional responsibility norms: Rudy Baylor in The Rainmaker
engages in bedside solicitation of a personal injury victim.14 Gray
Grantham, a reporter in The Pelican Brief, spies to discover the
identity of a telephone source after promising not to do so.15
Sometimes the violations are major felonies: Baylor and Mitch
Deere of The Firm both commit homicides. Deere’s seems to be
without legal justification or excuse, and although Baylor’s might
be legally excusable self-defense (or defense of another), he
contrives an elaborate and flagrantly lawless cover-up.16
Grisham clearly intends us to accept these actions as morally
justified. When he makes the bedside solicitation, Baylor is on the
verge of destitution (having been screwed by a prestigious corporate
firm that welched on an agreement to employ him) and fully intends
to do a good job for the client. Grantham plausibly believes that
identifying the source may save innocent lives, including the
source’s. The two homicides are in self-defense and both victims
are vicious predators (one a professional killer), but in neither case
could the law, the police, or the courts be trusted to vindicate the
hero.
In some books, Grisham delivers his moral lesson explicitly
14

John Grisham, The Rainmaker 182-88 (1995) [paper].

15

John Grisham, The Pelican Brief

16

John Grisham, The Firm 412-13 (1991); The Rainmaker 568-84.
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in the form of dialog. For example, in The Pelican Brief, a law
student -- Darby Shaw -- stumbles into a conspiracy that has led to
the murder of two Supreme Court Justices. Chased by killers, she
teams up with Gray Grantham, a Washington Post reporter, who is
introduced as a “serious, ethical reporter with just a touch of
sleaze.” The detective on whom he occasionally calls for “dirty
trick[s]” likes him because “he was honest about his sleaziness,” not
“pious” like his peers.17
Grantham does play an important “trick” in the story. An
anonymous source phones him repeatedly, indicating he knows
something about the conspiracy but feels unable to work up the
courage to pass it on. Grantham traces one of his calls to a pay
phone and sends his detective to watch the phone. When the source
phones next, Grantham signals the detective, who photographs the
caller at the pay phone.
When he shows Darby the picture -- at a time when killers
are hot on their trail -- she immediately raises the ethical issue:
“‘I take it he didn’t just pose for this.’
‘Not exactly.’ Grantham was pacing.
‘Then how’d you get it?’
‘I cannot reveal my sources.’
... ‘You’re scaring me, Grantham. This has a sleazy feel to
it. Tell me it’s not sleazy.’
‘It’s just a little sleazy, okay. The kid was using the same
pay phone, and that’s a mistake.’
‘Yes, I know. That’s a mistake.’
‘And I wanted to know what he looked like.’
‘Did you ask if you could take his photograph?’
‘No.’
‘Then it’s sleazy as hell.’
‘Okay. It’s sleazy as hell. But I did it, and there it is, and it
could be our link to Mattiece.’”18
17

Pelican Brief 129.

18

Id. at 230.
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Grisham does not appear to intend irony or humor in
portraying his characters as concerned with this matter of
professional ethics at a time when their lives and indeed the fate of
the republic are in jeopardy. Even Darby’s statement that
Grantham’s ethical lapse is “scaring” her at a time when she has
just survived two murder attempts is not supposed to be funny, just
charming. But Grisham does judge Darby as naive. The
photograph of the source does no harm to him and does in fact turn
out to be a critical link to the villain. The implication is that
willingness to engage in a small, considered amount of “sleaze” is
essential to being effectively “ethical.”19
In The Chamber, a young lawyer and a law professor
organize a bunch of students to make repeatedly phone calls to the
governor, falsely identifying themselves as local voters, and urging
him to grant clemency to a death row convict. As the hero explains
to his sister what’s going on, she asks,
“‘Is it legal?”
‘It’s not illegal.’
‘Is it ethical?’
‘What are they trying to do to Sam?’
‘Execute him.”
‘.... it’s murder, Carmen. Legal murder. It’s wrong, and I’m
trying to stop it. It’s a dirty business, and if I have to bend a few
ethics, I don’t care.’”20
The Rainmaker also contains an elaborate telephone fraud,
which the book portrays as a justified response to unlawful conduct
on the part of an opposing lawyer. However, the most explicit
ethics discussion occurs earlier when the hero is schooled by a
sleazy but decent paralegal on the bedside solicitation of accident
victims, a flagrant professional responsibility violation, but one that
19

In course of another breathless chase in The Client, a young boy teaches
the same lesson to attorney Reggie Love, as she reluctantly helps him escape
from the custody of the authorities, who are recklessly endangering his family
and otherwise blundering a murder investigation. The Client 349-50 (1993).
20
The Chamber 429 ( ).
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does no harm here and probably benefits the victim.21
“You see, Rudy, [Deck says,] in law school they don’t teach
you what you need to know. It’s all books and theories.... It’s an
honorable calling, governed by pages of written ethics.”
“What’s wrong with ethics?”
“Oh, nothing, I guess. I mean I believe a lawyer should
fight for his client, refrain from stealing money, try not to lie, you
know, the basics.”
Rudy finds that a more succinct statement of the valid
principles of legal ethics than anything he recalls from law school.
“But [Deck continues] what they don’t teach you in law
school can get you hurt.” Not only is solicitation the only way he
can make a living, it’s in the interest of at least the clients they
solicit. They plan to do a good job for their clients, and if they
refrained from soliciting, someone else would get them who might
be less loyal to them.22
III The You-Can-Have-It-All Glamour Fantasy of L.A. Law
L.A. Law is situated in a safer, more comfortable world than
Grisham’s novels.23 Grisham portrays elite law firms as dens of
iniquity and treachery. The McKenzie Brackman firm of L.A. Law
21

ABA Model Rules 7.3(a).

22

The Rainmaker 187-88. The Moral Pluck themes remain prominent in
Grisham’s more recent novels. In The Street Lawyer (1998) the hero steals a
client file from his law firm and breaches confidentiality norms in order to
expose wrongful conduct that has caused the death of a homeless family. In
The Testament (1999), the hero lies to the court the he has authority to represent
the legatee of a large fortune, in order to prevent the estate from being devoured
by a group of ne’er-do-well relatives and their bottom-feeding counsel. The
Runaway Jury (1996) and The Partner (1997) are revenge fantasies in which the
heroes pull off massive, flagrantly criminal (but nonviolent) scams against
wrongdoers who have previously victimized them.
23

L.A. Law was broadcast on NBC from 1986 to 1994. Its creator and
chief producer was Stephen Bochco.
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is not exempt from these qualities, but it is, above all, glamorous.
In many respects, the series resembles the wish- fulfillment
fantasies of novelists like Judith Krantz. Subject to preliminary and
episodic struggles, the heroes enjoy in abundance wealth, stylish
consumption, good looks, sex, and above all, exciting work.
(Family and friends, the summum bonum of an older popular genre
represented by the films of Frank Capra, are conspicuously low on
the list.)
Exciting work means high-profile roles in disputes over
cutting-edge issues that attract media attention. The McKenzie
Brackman lawyers spend little time slogging through construction
contract disputes or analyzing the minutia of bond indentures or
marshalling financial records for the IRS. They’re mostly in court
litigating issues like a hospital’s right to terminate life supports, or a
psychiatrist’s duty to warn about a dangerous patient, or the grey
areas of insider trading liability.24 Their remarkable firm and
staffing structures require few lawyers in subordinate roles; almost
all the lawyers act as lead attorneys all the time.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the L.A. Law
glamorous work fantasy is its ethical component. Part of being
glamorous is being ethical, which means, not avoiding unsavory
conduct and associations, but actively and ingeniously confronting
difficult issues -- showing Moral Pluck.
The show’s ethical commitments are incarnated in its central
thirtysomething characters -- Michael Kuzak, Victor Sifuentes,
Anne Kelsey, and Arnold Becker. They are set off by the two
senior partners, who serve as contrasting negative role models.
Leland McKenzie is a Polonius figure. He is appealingly wry and
avuncular but also unappealingly pompous and out-of-touch. His
ethical style is preachy and abstract. He is prone to invoke
categorical norms of rule or custom in ways that seem blind to the
most pressingly relevant circumstances of the situation. In doing
so, he strikes us as both emotionally and intellectually stunted. He
24

See Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 Yale Law
Journal 1607, 1607-12 (1989).
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has neither the passion nor the resourcefulness of his younger
colleagues. He also seems a little gutless. We sense that his
strongest commitments are not to the rules he cites, but to the
established old-money, old-fart social structure he hangs with.
On the other hand, we have Douglas Brackman, McKenzie’s
shamelessly materialistic and rapacious colleague. Brackman
doesn’t appreciate the moral or glamour value of the cutting edge
cases the litigators work on. He focuses relentlessly on the bottom
line. Ethics for him is merely a form of liability. The only norms
he respects are those whose violation would be likely to injure the
firm’s pecuniary interests. Brackman is a figure of vulgarity, and
eventually, farce. His manner is rude and abrupt; he is physically
plain in a group of extraordinarily attractive people, and in what
seems the creators’ ultimate expression of contempt, he turns out to
be sexually impotent.
The via media between these two dark paths is the one taken
by Michael Kuzak, Victor Sifuentes, Anne Kelsey, and Arnie
Becker. They like the material good life, but they lead it with style.
They’ve compromised their highest ideals for their more mundane
ambitions, but they haven’t denied or renounced these ideals. They
are still responsive to opportunities to serve the ideals in their
practices. They understand ethics less in terms of compliance with
rule and custom and more in terms of fidelity to the values that
underlie rule and custom.
The ethical challenges of the L.A. lawyers are sometimes
more complex than those of Grisham’s heroes because their clients
are less reliably virtuous. In the premiere episode, Kuzak turns in a
client to the police for violating parole by carrying a gun. The tip
enables the police to catch the client red-handed and forces him to
bargain for leniency by offering to plead guilty and testify against
his co-defendants in the rape prosecution in which Kuzak is
defending him. The client is a vicious ne’er-do-well (the son of one
of the firm’s business clients), and Kuzak seems to be motivated by
a combination of personal resentment (the client has assaulted him
with a gun) and sympathy for the rape victim. Kuzak proceeds to
offer his sympathy to the rape victim, and the episode closes with

14

MORAL PLUCK

them in a Platonic embrace.25
In conventional professional responsibility terms, the story
is over the top. The tip to the police was probably (though not
clearly) a violation of ethics rules.26 Continuing to represent the
client without telling him about the tip was certainly a violation.27
The story is vague on this and on Kuzak’s motivation. But it is
evidently trying to create a situation in which justice and humanity
require a departure from conventional role expectations, and to
portray Kuzak as admirable for daring such a departure.
(Conventional role expectations are represented by an unattractive,
snide lawyer for one of the client’s co-defendants, who traumatizes
the victim with aggressive cross-examination.)
The theme recurs with greater clarity and sophistication in
later episodes. In an especially interesting one, Kelsey defends a
water company in a tort suit on behalf of a child born deaf and
blind.28 Apparently, the defects were caused by contaminants in the
well that supplied the water her mother drank during pregnancy.
The client’s CEO concedes at trial that certain chemicals occur in
small amounts in the company’s water, which might have seeped
into the plaintiff’s well, but insists that the amounts are within
25

L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 3, 1986).

26

Under ABA Model Code DR 4-101, a lawyer may disclose otherwise
confidential information in order to prevent criminal activity by the client, and
under ABA Model Rule 1.6, she may disclose in order to prevent client criminal
activity “likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.” Kuzak’s
client was committing a crime by carrying a concealed weapon, and his armed
assault on Kuzak might indicate a likelihood of subsequent harm. The main
problem in analyzing the disclosure issue is that California has not enacted
either of the relevant model rules, and its norms on confidentiality are
exceptionally murky. See Fred Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in
California, 28 U.C. Davis Law Review 367 (1995).
27

See, for example, ABA Model Rule 1.4 on a lawyer’s duty to
communicate important information to the client.
28

L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 5, 1987).
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Environmental Protection Agency tolerances and that it is a
“scientific impossibility” that they could have injured the plaintiff.
The plaintiff appears to have no evidence to the contrary. Then, on
the verge of suffering dismissal, her lawyer receives from a whistleblower a “smoking gun” memo indicating that the company’s own
research had shown that chemicals in the amounts that the company
conceded were present created a high risk of serious and even fatal
injury.
The client promptly settles with the plaintiff for $2 million.
As a condition of the settlement, the plaintiff and her lawyer
promise to keep everything they know in confidence. When Kelsey
confronts the CEO of the client company, he concedes that he has
been fully aware of the research and that the company probably did
cause the plaintiff’s injuries. He acknowledges that further injuries
are likely, but says, shamelessly, that it is more profitable for him to
litigate and, if necessary, settle the claims that will be brought than
the remedy the problem. He brushes off her remonstrances and
instructs her not to disclose the problem to the authorities.
Kelsey returns later with a threat to go to the authorities.
The threat and Kelsey’s intimidating manner so cow the client that
he promptly capitulates and signs a contract Kelsey puts in front of
him promising to clean up the contamination. The show implies
that either the continuing threat of disclosure or the contract will
force the CEO to keep his promise. Kelsey has triumphed.
Analyzed dispassionately, Kelsey’s triumph is not entirely
plausible. The contract would surely be unenforceable judicially,
and the client’s quick capitulation seems unwarranted both by his
legal position and by his character. But Kelsey is so sympathetic,
her dilemma so painful, and the client so repulsive, that we suspend
disbelief and enjoy the “in your dreams” quality of the conclusion.
Last minute reversals of fortune are common in fiction, but it’s
interesting and perhaps novel to see this trope applied here (as in
other episodes of the series) to an ethical dilemma.
This episode features two negative ethical role models.
First, there’s the plaintiff’s lawyer. Until he gets the smoking gun,
he is stridently self-righteous, not only in court but in private
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conferences with Kelsey. He attacks her personally for defending a
wealthy corporation that is inflicting widespread injury on helpless
children. After he agrees to the settlement, Kelsey challenges him
about the propriety of the confidentiality condition and reminds him
of his prior professions of commitment to the interests of victims
generally. At this point, he becomes cynical and disclaims concern
for anyone but his client. As much as the vulgar selfishness of
Douglas Brackman, the strident self-righteousness of this plaintiff’s
lawyer is a quality incompatible with the have-it-all lawyering ideal
of L.A. Law. Self-righteous people are suspect and unattractive.
They never seem for real, and they seem dull and narrow.
But the most important theme is Moral Pluck. Lest we miss
the point, the episode concludes with a discussion between Kelsey
and the second negative role model -- Leland McKenzie in his most
flagrant Polonius mode. The water company CEO has complained
furiously to McKenzie about Kelsey’s shakedown, and he’s just
seen a resignation letter Kelsey sent the firm before she confronted
the CEO:
KELSEY: Since my actions were in violation of the
lawyer’s code of ethics and probably illegal, I decided to
resign from the firm to insulate you from liability.
MCKENZIE: I’m astonished. There are rules which
govern the conduct of attorneys. Rules which you cannot
disregard every time you decide you don’t like the client.
KELSEY: I made a decision.
MCKENZIE: Dammit! There was no decision to be
made! If all lawyers felt free to put themselves above the
law, our legal system would be reduced to anarchy.
KELSEY: If you’re looking for a lawyer who can turn off
her conscience and just follow rules with blind deference,
there’s the letter [that is, my resignation].
MCKENZIE: And if you’re looking to be a lawyer who
lets the law take a back seat to her personal sense of
morality, maybe I have to accept it.
KELSEY: Leland, we could argue this all night, and the
truth is, in the abstract I agree with you, but this wasn’t the
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abstract. This was real people who were going to die. I
don’t know what was right, and I don’t know what was
wrong. All I know is I couldn’t do it. Could you have done
it, Leland?
Leland is silenced. He looks at her helplessly, tears her
resignation letter in two, and walks out.
We could take issue with Kelsey’s characterization of the
situation. Perhaps in the most plausible real-world analogue, she
wouldn’t have violated any rules in threatening disclosure. In most
jurisdictions, if the client’s actions were criminal and posed a risk
of “imminent” bodily harm, disclosure would be warranted.29 It’s
possible that the company’s practices either of producing the
contaminated water with knowledge of its toxicity or of concealing
its research might be deemed criminal even if the contaminants
were within regulatory standards.30 Moreover, although the script
ignores it, the client has clearly committed both discovery abuse
and perjury under circumstances that arguably require counsel to
make disclosures to the court necessary to rectify matters.31
But this line of argument is pedantic. The show clearly
wants us to believe that Kelsey violated the rules, and most
members of the audience surely take that on stipulation. The point
is that violation of the rules is sometimes the right thing to do.
Kelsey says she believes in the rules “in the abstract” but that this
“wasn’t the abstract. It was real people.” The rules express a valid
principle, but their formulation is insensitive to critical
contingencies of her situation. McKenzie responds that the rules
29

ABA Model Rules 1.6(b)(1); ABA Model Code 4-101, but, as
observed above, California has no clear authority on the matter. See Zacharias,
cited in note 38.
30

Under the Clean Water Act, it is a crime to discharge “pollutants” into
water sources except in accordance with a permit process entailing elaborate
disclosure and reporting. See 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1318, 1319(c).

31

Model Rules 3.3(a)(4); Washington State Physicians Insurance
Exchange v. Fisons, 122 Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993).
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are “law” and entitled to respect by virtue of that status. He
suggests two reasons for this notion of obligation.
One is an appeal to role: Kelsey, as a lawyer, is obliged
categorically to respect the law. In appealing to “conscience” and
conceding McKenzie’s characterization of her actions as based on
her “personal sense of morality”, Kelsey’s response is
jurisprudentially unsophisticated. She could have defended her
actions as vindicating the substantive legal norms against the
company’s dangerous conduct, as violating one set of rules in order
to vindicate a more important one. But her point is still powerful:
If the moral scope of the lawyer role were as limited as McKenzie
suggests, it would be intolerably constricting and degrading. No
one of ambitious personal aspiration, and certainly no one needing
to “have it all”, would find the role worth taking.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of personal morality, the show
clearly portrays Kelsey as making, not just the best choice for her,
but the best choice for a lawyer. It views her as a better lawyer than
Leland McKenzie, and the latter comes close to conceding this as
he retreats in silence. But by insisting on her action as a violation
of the rules of confidentiality rather than a vindication of those
against polluting water, it makes her action appear transgressive.
We are expected to admire it all the more for this quality. She has
not just respected the lawyer role, she has improved it through
daring and initiative.
McKenzie’s second argument for categorical fidelity to his
narrow conception of “law” is an appeal to social order: If
everyone behaved like Kelsey, we’d have “anarchy.” A response
on the merits to this argument would be that Kelsey enhanced social
order by stopping the client’s dangerous conduct: If everyone felt
free to dump deadly chemicals in the water supply, we’d have
anarchy. But the show deems it unnecessary to make any response
to the “anarchy” argument. McKenzie’s posture is a familiar trope
in popular culture, and we immediately take it, not as a serious
position, but as a signal of the speaker’s fatuity. The posture
opposes to the terrors of anarchy deference to constituted authority,
but it is a bedrock premise of entertainment of this sort that
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constituted authority is corrupt or inept or both. Categorical
deference to constituted authority is an expression of cowardice or,
as in McKenzie’s case, cluelessness.
III.

Role Bursting at the Seams in The Practice

The setting of The Practice is less glamorous than L.A. Law
– Boston instead of L.A.; criminal defense and personal injury cases
instead of general civil litigation and business deals. Like the L.A.
Law lawyers but unlike Grisham’s, these lawyers persevere in their
commitment to lawyering careers and find them generally
satisfying, but their success is more uneven.32
This world is scarier than L.A. Law. Scary in part because
of recurring physical danger from clients and their associates and
threats of ruinous sanctions from prosecutors, judges, and other
state officials. Danger arises, not from a single, unified conspiracy
of the sort Grisham portrays, but from more diffuse and
idiosyncratic sources. In addition, the world is scary because of
pervasive moral and psychological uncertainty aggravated by
constant fissuring of role boundaries.
The aspirations of the Practice lawyers are more personal
and romantic than those of the L.A. Law lawyers. Bobby Donnell
and his colleagues have more than a genealogical kinship with the
lawyers of Ally McBeal, the other series created by David Kelley,
the producer and chief writer of The Practice. The Ally McBeal
lawyers are preoccupied by Sisyphian quests for love and personal
connection. The show treats their law practice as a vague
background for their romantic strivings and entanglements.
The lawyers of The Practice share these personal goals and
dispositions, but they take law more seriously. They want the
32

The Practice has been broadcast on ABC since 1998. Its creator and
chief writer-producer is David E. Kelley. Kelley was formerly a writer on L.A.
Law, although as I suggest in the text, the moral tone of The Practice (and of
Kelley’s other, contemporaneous show, Ally McBeal) is quite different from
L.A. Law.
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satisfactions of skillful performance of an established social role
and belief that it contributes to the social good. But they endlessly
confront technical and moral challenges to these goals. Wherever
they turn, they find reasons to doubt that their clients are innocent
or otherwise virtuous or that their success in suppressing evidence
or demonstrating reasonable doubt contributes to justice even in
some indirect, long-run sense.
The most distinctive feature of the moral world of The
Practice is the way personal and professional realms engulf each
other. The lawyers seem compelled to seek their personal needs in
their work relationships, and the dangers and uncertainties of their
work reach back to disrupt their personal lives.
We see this most visibly in friendship and dating relations.
Throughout the series, at least one member of this firm of defense
lawyers has been living with or dating one of the prosecutors who
most frequently oppose them in court. Bobby used to date her; then
Lindsay roomed with her; then Ellenor replaced her. Lindsay
moves out to live with Bobby, her law partner, and subsequently
becomes engaged to him. The prosecutor is now being courted by a
colleague in her office. Ellenor dates a client she has defended on a
murder charge. Jimmy is dating a judge before whom he often
appears; he is tempted to end this relation when he encounters an
old girl friend who is now a client of the office. One of the firm’s
clients turns out to be sleeping with the police officer who is the
chief prosecution witness against him. A majority of the firm’s
clients are personal friends of one or more of the lawyers.
This breaching of boundaries leads to both personal and
professional chaos. It turns out that Ellenor’s client really is a
murderer; he almost kills Lindsay in the office; then on a date with
Ellenor, he attacks her and is shot by her prosecutor roommate. At
a tryst with his judicial lover in her office, Jimmy finds a document
on her desk that leads him to suspect, wrongly, that she is
responsible for a crime for which a client has been charged. He
confides his suspicions to the police, who arrest the judge. After
she exonerates herself, she comes to Jimmy’s apartment to forgive
him, and to have sex with him, and is mistaken for an assailant and
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again confronted with the police.
Not surprisingly, confidences prove difficult to maintain in
this environment. When he’s dating Helen Gamble, the prosecutor,
Bobby is in her apartment one evening and overhears her
conversing with a colleague about a client of his. He relays the
information to the client, with disastrous consequences. Later,
when Helen is rooming with Lindsay, Bobby leaves a message for
Lindsay on the answering machine, which Helen overhears, again
with disastrous consequences.
The demands of moral self-assertion often burst the
constraints of conventional role norms. This occurs in two recent
scenes involving suppression motions that seem likely, if granted, to
free guilty defendants. In one, the judge acknowledges from the
bench that the motion is valid but then denies it, saying that she
refuses to be responsible the consequences that would ensue. Let
the appeals court do the dirty work, she says. In another, Bobby
argues the grounds of the motion and then, visibly out of control,
denounces his client in open court as a morally disgusting person.
Bobby is the most extreme of the characters is this respect.
He has a reputation as a hot-head, and he frequently defies judges in
court. But the issue with him seems less a matter of emotional selfcontrol than a refusal to surrender his values to the demands of role.
His outbursts and role transgressions always seems to arise from
plausible moral judgments, and they sometimes exhibit that
combination moral and tactical acuity I’ve called Moral Pluck.
Consider a scenario involving infanticide.33 Bobby is called
to the home of a friend on what appears to be a life-and-death
matter. He asks his partner Eugene Young to accompany him.
Eugene is a foil for Bobby. He is the most polished and selfassured of the lawyers, and the one with the most conventionally
professional orientation. Bobby wants him to serve as a check on
his own impulsiveness.
The friend/client lives in an upper middle class suburban
33

“A Day in the Life” (ABC television broadcast, January 10, 1999).
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home with his wife and teenage daughter. He has just discovered
the his daughter, whom he had no idea was pregnant, gave birth
during the night in her bedroom, and the baby has died. Initially it
appears that the baby was smothered accidentally when the
daughter tried to hide it under some towels. Then, it emerges that
the mother deliberately smothered the baby when she discovered
the situation.
Two issues of professional responsibility are developed in
exchanges between Bobby and Eugene. Eugene immediately
frames the issue as legal ethics doctrine suggests it should be
framed – as staying on the right side of the line that separates legal
advice from assisting client illegality. The lawyer can and should
tell the client what the law requires and prohibits and what penalties
it prescribes for violations of its commands. But the lawyer risks
liability if he discusses more informal contingencies in a way that
encourages the clients to compound their illegal conduct. The
father wants to know whether he should call the authorities, what he
should say to them, and what, if anything, he should do with the
body. His main interest is not what the law requires, but what
course is action is likely to lead to the best result for his family.
Bobby wants to talk about this openly, but Eugene cautions him to
restrict himself to narrowly legal advice.
When it first appears that the mother may be responsible,
Eugene raises the conflict-of-interest issue. The mother and
daughter have potentially conflicting interests. Either of them
facing indictment or conviction might find it in her interest to
implicate the other. If the evidence implicates one more strongly,
the other has less to lose and more to gain individually from calling
the police. In these circumstances, the rules forbid representation of
both parties unless the lawyer is confident that joint representation
will not adversely affect anyone’s interest.34 Of course, in the
circumstances, one can’t be confident of anything. Eugene
plausibly suggests that the default option should be separate
representation for daughter and mother.
34

Model Rule 1.7.
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Bobby won’t have any of this. He will not look at the
family as separate individuals with conflicting interests. He will not
try to slice out the narrow, safely legal dimension of the situation
and restrict himself to it. He insists on taking on the whole
situation. He wants to deal with the clients as a family, and he
wants to help them. The husband is inclined to try to bury the baby
in the hope of concealing its death, and Bobby is willing to risk
liability by discussing this as a serious option. But he is also shaken
with horror at the death of the baby and angry at callousness of at
least his two adult clients.
Ultimately, Bobby decides that the baby must have a
religious burial. He will not permit the family to bury the baby in
secret. The must leave it at a church, where it will be taken care of.
He names a particular church, a Catholic one, with which he has an
association; we’re never told what, if any religious association, the
family might have. Bobby tells his friend to leave the baby at the
back door of the church at a designated time. He will make sure
that it is promptly recovered without the friend being observed. If
they fail to do this, he tells them emphatically, he will report them
to the police. In the last scene, we see the friend following Bobby’s
instructions outside the church, as Bobby looks on from his car.
It would be difficult to think of a response to the situation
that would more flout established professional responsibility norms
than Bobby’s. He violates his duties to both the public, by actively
assisting in the concealment of a birth and a murder, and the clients,
by ignoring their conflicting interests and by coercing them through
the threat of an improper breach of confidence.35 Yet we are
supposed to sympathize and even admire him for it, and most of us
probably do.
35

By burying the body in secret, the clients would probably be
committing a crime. However, in most states, including Massachusetts,
disclosure would still be prohibited. Model Rule 1.6 permits disclosure only to
prevent (future) harm threatening death or substantial bodily injury.
Massachusetts and other states have broadened the rule to include other harms,
but all involve future injury to specific, living individuals. Only in the few
states that retain DR 4-101 of the Model Code of Professional Conduct is
disclosure permitted to prevent criminal acts of any kind.

24

MORAL PLUCK

This is easiest with respect to his disregard of conflict-ofinterest norms.
These norms do not fit family situations
comfortably. They require that the lawyer treat family members as
potentially hostile individuals rather than as an affective
community. In one sense, this scenario illustrates the concerns on
which the norms are premised. The mother has given some
indication of a willingness to let the daughter take the blame for a
murder she appears to have committed. Yet, even in this relatively
compelling situation, we sense that Bobby is right to resist the
Eugene’s, and the profession’s, perspective.
The basic problem is this: Where individual interests
potentially conflict, the bar portrays separate representation as a
device for maximizing informed choice on the part of the clients. In
fact, however, separate representation doesn’t simply protect
interests, it constitutes them. The choice between joint and separate
representation influences people’s sense of their interests, and it
may affect the range of options open to them. Separate counsel is
more likely to lead the daughter to take a view of her interests that
precludes collaboration with her parents. And once additional
outsiders become involved in the situation, the practical possibility
of concealing the tragedy will diminish.
So Bobby refuses to default to separate representation. He
sees these people as still a family, despite what’s happened. Their
common interests dominate their separate ones, and he refuses to
impede their ability to act together.
He does, however, force them to deliver the corpse to the
church. Some people will find this move more difficult to justify
than the other transgressive interventions we have considered. In
the other cases, the actors disregarded the priority afforded to the
relevant competing values by elite moralism, but the values to
which they appealed were clearly public values. Here Bobby seems
to be influenced fundamentally by his private religious
commitments. To the extent that he uses his power to vindicate his
private beliefs, he seems more vulnerable to the charge of
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illegitimate coercion than the actors in the other scenarios.36
Yet his actions may seem morally appealing even to those
who do not share his religious beliefs. Bobby feels he should not
report the crime. This sentiment seems based on a personal and
professional confidentiality commitment. Perhaps it is also based
on a sense of the futility and crudeness of criminal punishment in
cases like this. The wrongdoer is not dangerous; there’s little
likelihood of recidivism. Her punishment might serve the purpose
of deterring future crimes by others, but deterrent effects are highly
speculative. The one undeniable potential role for the criminal
process would be public affirmation of the value the life of the
infant and condemnation of the murder. But the criminal process is
riven with demagogic posturing and bureaucratic rigidity that
compromises its ability to perform such functions. The cynicism of
lawyers and the media and the inflexible harshness of the rules
makes it a poor vehicle of moral expression.
So the Catholic burial may seem an appealing substitute. It
affords ceremonial affirmation of the value of life in a context that
is less public but also less profane. I imagine many nonreligious
people might agree. (At times of great tragedy, such people
sometimes wish they were religious.) Even if we don’t identify
with many of the themes of the ritual, we may identify with some
and appreciate the effort to take them seriously in this context. The
point is not that Bobby imposes his private religious convictions.
The point is that the church ceremony seems to be the best available
way to serve a public need at a time when the official processes
seem inadequate and when confidentiality values weigh against
invoking them. Bobby draws on the Catholic ceremony in order to
reconcile these competing values. Viewed this way, his actions
36

It’s possible that Bobby knows that the family is Catholic and believes
that he is forcing them to respect their own convictions. However, the scenario
is silent on this point. The coercion charge might by blunted if this were true,
but it would not lose its force. In the perhaps dominant view, religious duties
are voluntarily undertaken, and it is not the role of co-religionists to enforce
them against each other.
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exemplify the resourcefulness of Moral Pluck.
V. Lessons from Popular Culture
This material from popular culture has two potential
contributions to ethics: first as a source of evidence about popular
moral thinking, second as a substantive contribution to ethical
understanding.
The two concerns are related because the normative
pronouncements of elite moralism are partly based on empirical
assumptions about popular moral thinking.
Elite moralism
sometimes explains its affinity for categorical and authoritarian
injunction as necessary to popular moral understanding. In this
view, it is because ordinary people think in categorical and
authoritarian terms that public ethical pronouncements need to be
expressed in such terms.
For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
defends its categorical injunction of obedience to positive law by
saying:
Because of his position in society, even minor violations of
law by a lawyer tend to lessen public confidence in the legal
profession.37
We can see the implications both that elite conduct has a
disproportionate influence on popular belief and that ordinary
people perceive that conduct through categorical moral grids.
Lawyers might be able to perceive the difference between
indefensible and defensible (“minor”) violations, but they lay
public could not.

37

EC 1-5.
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These premises drove some of the most impassioned
rhetoric of the House Impeachment Managers. They repeatedly
described the exemplary influence of the President’s conduct as to
legitimate or encourage, not perjury about consensual sex or
immaterial sex, but perjury in general, with the consequence that
the “rule of law” was placed in jeopardy.38
When the House Impeachment Managers noticed that the
masses were not buying their condemnation of the President, they
were inclined to speculate that the public was becoming
dangerously indifferent to moral issues.
They saw public
disagreement as arising from a moral “relativism.”39 Richard
Posner interprets the public sympathy for the President as arising
from a “popular morality” preoccupied with nonmoral personal
attractiveness. The public cynically winks at the moral failings of
people they find attractive, he suggests.40
38

E.g., “Linking the People’s Trust in the President to the World’s
Trust in America,” New York Times, January 17, 1999, at A31 (Remarks of
Rep. Henry Hyde at the Impeachment Trial: “The issue is whether the
President has violated the rule of law....”); “The Four Elements of Perjury,”
New York Times, Jan. 16, 1999, at A13 (Remarks of Rep. Steve Chabot: “...if
the actions of the President are ultimately disregarded or minimized we will
be sending a sorry message to the American people: that the President of the
United States is above the law. We will be sending a message to our children
... that telling the truth doesn’t really matter....”); “An Attack on What Has
Been Characterized as the ‘So What?’ Defense”, New York Times, Jan. 17,
1999, at 29 (Remarks of Rep. Stephen Buyer: “If indeed the President is
successful in trying to make everyone believe that this case is only about an
illicit affair, what will the message be in this hallowed body to those who’ve
in the past been passionate advocates of our civil rights laws, whether it be by
race, gender, religion, disability?”). For a more considered and cautious
assessment, see Richard Posner, An Affair of State: The Investigation,
Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton 153-59 (1999).
39

Cite

40

Posner says that “popular justice”, which he defines as the “ideas of
justice that are held by the average person untrained in law,” tends “to
degenerate into popularity contests.” Id at 92 (1999).
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But the works we’re considering suggest a different
hypothesis. The moral orientation of these works is neither cynical
nor indifferent to principle. It just doesn’t share the categorical,
authoritarian premises of elite moralism. If these works are any
guide, the public is less susceptible to elite influence than the elites
like to think. It is less troubled by defiance of authority because it
has much lower expectations of authority. And it tends not to see
ethical norms and issues categorically. It is more willing to see
formally enacted norms as qualified by more informal norms and
more inclined to see all norms as presumptions that can be rebutted
in situations where competing values of greater weight are at stake.
The appeal of these works depends on the audience’s ability and
disposition to judge contextually rather than categorically.41
In this light, popular indifference to the President’s perjury
may reflect a simply a tendency to interpret it more narrowly – as
illegal lies to preserve the privacy of consensual sex, rather than
illegal lies period. Public opinion may more sensitive to the
competing value of privacy, notwithstanding its weaker
formalization than the perjury norm. (Recall that the last time the
public disappointed the conservative moralists – in the defeat of
Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court – privacy values
seemed an important part of the explanation.) And it may be more
sensitive to the arguable abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Wright in allowing coercive inquiry into consensual sex without
adequate justification; on the part of Kenneth Starr for his reckless,
costly, and prurient pursuit of the matter, and of the House
leadership for its instant worldwide publication of Starr’s report in
all its pornographic detail.
41

Of course, I have described only one strand of popular culture. If
you turn from favorable portrayals of lawyering to favorable portrayals of the
police, you see a different attitude toward government authority. Even here,
however, the attitude is mixed. The virtuous police officer often has to work
against her superiors and the larger governmental structure, which are rarely
as virtuous as she, and this often requires her to violate promulgated norms in
order to vindicate more fundamental, but less formal, ones.
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The second potential contribution of these works is
substantive. They give us an ethical perspective that competes
with elite moralism as a source of moral guidance. The tone of this
perspective is Emersonian. It is an ethic of self-assertion that
encourages us to think of ethics as an occasion for creativity. By
contrast, the tone of elite moralism is Puritanical and Kantian. It is
an ethic of self-constraint that emphasizes the need to curb our
more aggressive and destructive impulses through deference to
external authority. Moral Pluck insists that ethics is not simply a
matter of duties to society, but of character and personal integrity.
While philosophers have argued for perspective abstractly,42
popular culture teaches it by urging us to identify imaginatively
with an attractive figure and then confronting us with the damage
to the character’s commitments and self-conception that deference
to authority sometimes would require.
At the same time, these works insist that we take account of
situations in which norms of authority are in tension with
substantive justice. The remind us incessantly of the widespread
ineptitude and corruption of official institutions. At one extreme -in the darker Grisham novels -- these institutions are integral parts
of a vast criminal conspiracy. In a more mundane realm, the
problem is simply limited information. Kelsey says to the water
company executive, “If the EPA had this information, they’d shut
you down in a second.” The problem is that the EPA doesn’t have
the information. The works also remind us of the limitations of
categorical norms that arise from their unresponsiveness to vital
dimensions of some morally urgent situations. The confidentiality
norm is the most prominent example. Many of these works try to
demonstrate that the bar’s established norms are potentially
incompatible with morally plausible responses to situations with
high stakes.
These are important lessons, and elite moralism is deficient
for ignoring them. If you had to choose between elite and popular
42

E.g., Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarian Ethics,” in
Utilitarianism: For and Against 77, 108-18 (1977); Alasdair MacIntyre, After
Virtue 204-25 (2d ed. 1984).
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moralism, you might do well to choose the popular one. The
official one implies an absurdly naive and complacent attitude
toward constituted authority and a hostility toward contextual
judgment that is incompatible with ethical autonomy. Its view of
the good lawyer is unattractive in its passivity and unreflective
deference. These are the lessons that popular culture has for
professional responsibility doctrine.
Nevertheless, the type of popular works we are considering
have undeniable limitations as a form of ethical reflection. It is a
familiar complaint that popular culture oversimplifies. Instead of
promoting reflection, it gratifies unconscious desires for selfassertion by abstracting away the most important moral and
strategic difficulties of real world ethical dilemmas. Some of us
get visceral satisfaction watching Clint Eastwood or Sylvester
Stallone blow away bad guys unconstrained by due process or
physical limitations, but we don’t on reflection regard their
characters as role models. These fantasies grossly understate the
dangers of transgressive self- assertion and underestimate the
importance of institutional authority.
The works we’ve considered are vastly more self-conscious
and thoughtful about ethics than the typical Hollywood “action”
movie. Still, it has to be conceded that, as ethical discourse, they
are unambitious.43 To begin with, the dilemmas they portray tend
to take a Manichean form with implausible frequency. The works
mislead by suggesting that, in the situations where lawyers
perceive a tension between the dictates of established authority and
43

Thus, to use Patrick Ewing and Susan Silbey’s terms, I’d put these
works in an intermediate category between “subversive stories”, which distance
us from conventional understandings of established social structures, and
“hegemonic tales”, which reinforce such understandings. The Moral Pluck
literature satisfies Ewing and Silbey’s central criterion of subversiveness: These
works “emplot the connection between the particular and the general”. They do
so by emphasizing the connection between transgressive self-assertion and
institutional failure. However, their portrayal of both self-assertion and
institutional failure is one-dimensional. See Patrick Ewick and Susan Silbey,
“Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative,”
29 Law and Society Review 197, 218-19 (1995).
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their conceptions of substantive justice, the decision in favor of
justice would usually be supported by the broader lay culture. In
fact, popular moral values are strongly divided across a broad
range of situations. There are many situations in which many
people would find unattractive the substantive values lawyers
would assert in good faith defiance of constituted authority.
(Racists and fascists are rarely portrayed in the movies or on
television as self-consciously principled, but no doubt some of
them are.) Moreover, if passivity and unreflective deference are
unattractive, so can moralistic self-assertion be. Lionel Trilling’s
complaint that the “liberal imagination” tends to ignore that “the
moral passions are even more willful and impatient and imperious
than the self-seeking passions” is pertinent to the works we’ve
looked at.44
The attitude expressed in these works toward institutions is
also fanciful. The problem is not so much that they exaggerate the
ineptitude and corruption of official institutions, though they
probably do. More importantly, they portray Moral Pluck
exclusively as an individual matter. The protagonists accomplish
their heroic feats by themselves, or with the informal help of a few
close friends. And their own transgressive initiatives leave no
institutional traces.
They don’t contribute to new, more
satisfactory institutions or alter the basic contours of established
ones.
Kelsey emphasizes her solitude by resigning from the firm
before confronting the CEO. She doesn’t even try to persuade
McKenzie that she did the right thing, much less try to enlist the
firm in her effort; she simply offers to leave. In Grisham’s novels,
the hero’s achievement never becomes public. The downfall of the
villain is typically presented to the public as the work of
established institutions, and the official ineptitude and corruption
that required the hero’s Moral Pluck is covered up. The hero often
acquiesces in the cover-up as part of the price of extricating
44
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himself or his friends or clients from their difficulties. This trope
reinforces the crude populist premise that we are surrounded by a
corrupt power that determines our fate but that we cannot see or
influence. The hero redeems himself morally, helps some people,
perhaps even averts a catastrophe, but he never changes the system
much. Thus, a deep pessimism about the larger society co-exists
with the romantic view of individual initiative.
This hostility to institutions is a further objection to Moral
Pluck as an ethical ideal. For one thing, Moral Pluck seems
implausible as a practical matter. As the solitary exploits of Clint
Eastwood and Sylvester Stallone seems physically implausible,
those of the prodigies of Moral Pluck seem to depend on unlikely
assumptions about the capacity of even extraordinary individuals
to manipulate people and institutions. On reflection these exploits
don’t inspire emulation. We plausibly doubt our ability to
accomplish them by ourselves.
Moreover, even if we could, the life of these heroes may
strike us as unattractively lonely. The L.A. Law lawyers are
exceptions; everything nearly always works out for them, and as
we’ve noted, friendship and solidarity don’t seem important to
them. However, despite their amazing successes, Grisham heroes
rarely achieve satisfying careers, especially as lawyers. They have
a tendency to leave the profession. The heroes of The Firm and
The Partner drop out of society entirely for lives of luxurious
seclusion. Rudy Baylor of The Rainmaker gives up law to become
a high school teacher. The lawyers of The Practice are luckier in
this respect. There is more solidarity among the lawyers of the
Donnell firm than there is in McKenzie, Brackman or any Grisham
firm. But the solidarity doesn’t seem to extend beyond the firm.
The firm is under constant siege from hostile outside forces.
Nevertheless, there are moments, especially on The
Practice, when these limitations are overcome, or at least
acknowledged. Consider a recent episode involving Jimmy
Berluti.45 Jimmy occupies the opposite pole of the spectrum of
45
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moral orientations from Eugene Young. He is the least polished
and most ingenuous of the lawyers. He is often uncomfortable in
role and sometimes recklessly inclined to assert his personal
commitments at the expense of professional decorum.
In this episode, Jimmy’s client, a murder defendant, insists
of taking a fall to protect his son, who actually committed the
crime. He refuses to permit Jimmy to confront the son. Jimmy
decides to do so anyway and tries to persuade a friend – Judge
Roberta Kittleson – to help him do so. Roberta refuses on the
ground that Jimmy would be violating the rules of client loyalty
and confidentiality. (The breach of role boundaries that such
participation would involve for a judge is so much a routine feature
of the series that it is not even mentioned here.) Jimmy goes ahead
alone, and the confrontation is a disaster – the son commits
suicide. Roberta tries to console him, telling him that at least he
tried to do the right thing, while she feels bad that she remained
passive. Jimmy replies that at least she has the consolation of
knowing she followed the rules. But he took a course of action
that could only be vindicated by success, and having failed, he
feels bereft.
The argument is an implicit response to the charge of
naivete and over-simplification in two respects.
First, it
acknowledges that independent, transgressive judgment is risky
and can work out badly. Second, it reminds us that virtue cannot
be measured solely in terms of consequential success. Jimmy’s
self-criticism doesn’t entirely persuade us. Despite his expression
of regret and inconsolability, we admire his good intentions and
willingness to take risks.46 On the other hand, there’s nothing glib
46
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cases that Bernard Williams focused on in his essay “Moral Luck”, cited in
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decisionmaker. When the projects fail, and the growth does not occur, it is
difficult for the decisionmaker, looking back, to see the decision as right,
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or smug about the conclusion. The show doesn’t seek to resolve
more than partly the anxiety and uncertainty we feel about
Jimmy’s decision.
VI. Conclusion
Moral Pluck – a combination of transgression and
resourcefulness in the service of virtue – is a pervasive theme in
some of the most prominent favorable portrayals of lawyering in
recent popular culture. As ethical discourse, these works suffer
from a preoccupation with extreme situations, a tendency to
oversimplify the dangers and difficulties of independent ethical
decisionmaking, and an unreflective suspicion of institutions.
Nevertheless, as social data, the works are usefully in indicating
how different popular moral understanding may be from
established professional norms. And in their insistence on the
limitations of categorical norms and constituted authority, they are
a valid corrective to biases of professional responsibility doctrine.

even ex ante. (His examples are the Gauguin abandoning his family to
become a painter in the South Seas – a successful and therefore right decision
– and Anna Karenina abandoning her family to live with Count Vronsky – an
unsuccessful and therefore wrong decision.) But Jimmy’s decision is
different. His intentions do not embrace any project of personal development.
He is seeking to vindicate an enduring commitment to substantive justice. Of
course, if he was reckless in appraising the probable consequences, that bears
on our assessment of his initial decision. But the bad consequence only raises
the question; it doesn’t establish recklessness. And even if he was reckless,
we might plausibly regard his good intentions as mitigating.
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